

Structural Differentiation as an indicator of political development in the KRI: the role of the two ruling political parties

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Abstract

Political development refers to the process of creating and institutionalizing political organizations and procedures, with the effectiveness of an organization largely dependent on the level of support it receives from various segments of society. It is influenced by structural differentiation, the pursuit of equality, and the capacity of a political system to adapt, address, and adjust. Political scientists have varying opinions on indicators of political development, with structural differentiation being one of the most prominent. This article aims to assess the impact of two dominant political parties, namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), on Kurdistan's political development, using a survey questionnaire. Investigating that query, a theoretical background on political development and structural differentiation is provided, followed by a methodology section and an analysis of the survey results. The study involved 550 students from ten public universities in the Kurdistan Region, representing a diverse range of socioeconomic backgrounds. The questionnaire was created using Freedom House Index criteria and was distributed to participants in various faculties and universities.

Keyword: political development, structural differentiation, KDP, PUK, the KRI, questionnaire.

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Introduction

Political development emerged as a key focus in political science since 1950, motivated by the need to address the challenges encountered by newly independent nations. This development is influenced by factors such as institutional strength, stability, and leadership, with political parties playing a central role. They act both as products of political development and as catalysts for it, essential in representing the public and promoting democratic principles. As key actors, political parties can both facilitate and hinder political development, especially on the issue of statehood and state institutions within the framework of structural differentiation. This research, employing a mixed-method approach, seeks to examine the role of the two ruling political parties, the KDP and PUK, in the context of political development, with a particular emphasis on structural differentiation. The central research question is: *What role have the two ruling political parties, KDP and PUK, played in promoting or hindering structural differentiation as a key dimension of political development in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)?*

There has been extensive research on political development, both globally and specifically in the Kurdistan Region. For instance, Hiwa Majid's 2016 study, *"The Obstacles to Political Development in the Kurdistan Region 1992-2014,"* examines the barriers to political progress in the region. Similarly, Gareth Stansfield's 2003 work, *"Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy,"* explores the emergence of democracy in the region. Aram Naji Mohammed's 2017 study, *"The Role of Parties in the Political Development of Post-*

Conflict Societies: A Case Study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," focuses on the role of political parties in post-conflict development.

What distinguishes our study is its specific focus on the role of political parties, particularly the two dominant ones—the PUK and KDP—within the framework of political development. Our research stands out not only due to this focus but also because of the unique mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data through a questionnaire. Additionally, our study is set apart by the distinctive characteristics of our research sample and the specific period under investigation. The significance of this research lies in its direct relevance to the political rights of citizens in the Kurdistan Region, impacting their daily lives and lived experiences.

In addition to gathering input from citizens, each argument is supported by insights from scholars, previous studies, and reports from independent local and international organizations. This ensures that the study is not solely based on the opinions of the research sample, but is further enriched with data and information from a broad range of credible sources, adding depth and validity to the findings.

Theoretical background of political development

Defining the concept of political development is a difficult task. Multiple researchers have provided several perspectives, each presenting a unique interpretation of the subject. According to Huntington (1965), political development refers to the progression of creating and institutionalizing political organizations and procedures. The effectiveness of an organization depends on the level of support it receives from different segments of society and its degree of institutionalization in terms of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Coleman defines political evolution as the continuous interaction between the processes of structural differentiation, the pursuit of equality, and the capacity of a political system to incorporate, address, and adjust (Sandbrook, 1976). Moreover, as stated by Almond (1969), the progress of politics relies on the capacity of political systems to efficiently tackle the difficulties that emerge throughout times of political, social, and economic change. Plano and Riggs define political development as the progressive and transformative changes that occur within political systems, including the transition from one system to another. This process generally leads to an enhanced capacity of the government to efficiently address the demands imposed upon it (Riggs, 1981). Coleman (2015) underscores the importance of education and stresses that its role in instructing both the public and political figures should not be underestimated. He had

the conviction that an educated populace would be more actively involved in politics, while a proficient political elite might facilitate the connection between the governing class and the general public. Cammack (1994) argued that the main emphasis of political development was on the endeavors to involve the general populace, especially in developing countries.

Structural differentiation as an indicator of political development

Political scientists have varying opinions on the indicators of political development. Almond and Powell (1966) argue that political development can be evaluated by examining three factors: structural differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization. These researchers are considered prominent in the field of studying indicators of political development. According to them, political development is the capacity of a political system to adjust to changes in its local and international surroundings, specifically in domains like state-building, nation-building, participation, and income distribution within society. Similarly, Weiner and Binder (1971) emphasize the significance of the interplay of three fundamental processes: structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality, and the capacity of the political system. Their definition of structural differentiation encompasses the allocation and specialization of roles within a state's institutions, the equitable allocation of rights among its population, and the ability of the political system to adjust and meet the needs of the populace. Regarding differentiation, Pye (1965) argues that “*differentiation is not fragmentation and the isolation of the different parts of the political system but specialization based on an ultimate sense of integration*”. Differentiation refers to the existence of distinct agencies and entities, each with specific and limited roles. Furthermore, the process of policy-making and decision-making must be complex. Based on the aforementioned, it can be safely stated that structural differentiation is considered, among many, one of the most prominent indicators of political development.

In sum, Structural differentiation can generally be defined as the process by which policy and decision-making within a state or society becomes increasingly complex, involving the participation of specialized and professional bodies and institutions. Each of these entities maintains its independence, while also complementing and being interconnected with one another, ensuring that decision-making power is not concentrated in a single person or institution.

Methodology

In this article, the authors aim to measure the influence of the two dominant parties on the Kurdistan Regions's political development particularly in terms of structural differentiation. To evaluate political development in the the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the aforementioned scholars employed structural differentiation. The quantitative method adopted, for collecting data about the impact of the two ruling political parties on political development, is a survey questionnaire.

To determine how much the governing political parties have influenced the political development of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, students at various public universities in the region were asked a series of questions.

Our survey required a population. Our population is 18–24-year-old university students. One reason we survey public university students is sample representativeness. Kurdistan Region public universities draw students from governorates, towns, districts, sub-districts, and villages. Thus, they likely represent the population. Assuming that a large percentage of public college students come from low- or middle-income homes, they make up the majority of Kurdistan families.

Ten of the twenty Kurdistan Region public universities were sampled. The following universities are picked in no particular order: Salahaddin, Sulaimani, Duhok, Koya, Soran, Zakho, Raparin, Halabja, Garmian, and Charmo. The researchers used non-random sampling to select these colleges and others to increase representativeness. Increase our sample's demographic representation. First, researchers chose five universities per zone¹. Within each zone, we tried to balance selection regionally. In governorates and independent administrations with multiple public universities, one was picked. Finally, students at these universities come from all around the region, not only their governorate or independent administration.

550 students were surveyed, 55 from each of the ten public universities. The researchers distributed 550 questionnaires, but 35 were invalidated due to incomplete or non-return. Students at each university were chosen randomly. University cafeterias and recreational

¹ The yellow and green zones of influence refer to the areas controlled by the two ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These zones are named referring to the colors of the parties' flags and reflect a historical background of power, popular support, and geographical control by each party (Ala' Aldeen, 2022). The KDP controls the cities of Erbil and Duhok, known as the yellow zone, while the PUK governs Sulaimani and the Garmian region, known as the green zone.

gardens were used to distribute the surveys to all students. After distributing the forms, the researchers positioned themselves apart from the questionnaires to ensure participant comfort. In addition to the demographic questions, to evaluate the role of the two ruling political parties in political development through the structural differentiation variable, twelve questions were in the questionnaire. These questions were for the evaluation of structural differentiation in the executive, legislature, judiciary, and a few other institutions such as the security forces.

Creating our research questionnaire was a major limitation. We had no specific ready-made ruling political parties' related questionnaires to use. Thus, we had to create our own questionnaire. Yet, this is not to say that our questionnaire comes from nowhere at all. We used the Freedom House Index criteria (Freedom House Survey, 2014) and scholars' indicators for political development to create the questionnaire. This was originally to measure the role of governments in political development, yet the questionnaire was adjusted to fit the role of political parties in political development. The questionnaire had to be carefully designed to reflect the conceptual definitions of structural differentiation.

The use of the quantitative method in this research is driven by the nature of the study and the type of main research question being investigated. Specifically, the research aims to examine the role of the two ruling parties in political development, with a focus on the dimension of structural differentiation. This involves analyzing the separation of institutions, the distinct characteristics of each authority and institution, and the capacity of state institutions and authorities to effectively perform their functions and duties. To achieve this objective, it was essential to include citizens as research participants, as the strengths and weaknesses of each institution and authority are directly linked to freedoms, rights, and the provision of state services that significantly affect citizens' lives. Consequently, it was important to employ specific procedures and scientific justifications for selecting the sample to ensure that the measurements accurately reflect the perspectives and experiences of the populace.

In addition, the researcher did not solely rely on the opinions of the participants; rather, these opinions were further supported and enriched with findings from research studies, local and international reports, and authoritative scientific sources. This comprehensive approach enhances the robustness of the analysis and provides a more nuanced understanding of the issues discussed.

Regarding the scientific procedural, the questionnaire followed all established scientific procedures and stages and was designed based on Freedom House's criteria for measuring

democracy and political development in countries. Additionally, it incorporated the views of political scientists on key indicators of political development, with a particular focus on structural differentiation. This concept is emphasized by notable scholars such as Huntington (1965), Pye (1965), Coleman (1965), Bashiriah (2004), Almond and Powell (1966), Packenham (1964), Eckstein (1982), Binder (1971), and Lapalombara (1966).

After consulting a statistical expert, it was determined that for each community with a population exceeding 100,000, the appropriate distribution rate of forms is 384. This indicates that the researcher adhered to statistical criteria in determining the sample size. While a higher ratio would yield a larger n value, which is preferable, the sample size should not fall below this minimum threshold to ensure the reliability and validity of the results. Moreover, the questionnaire was previously sent to six academics and political science experts at universities in the Kurdistan Region to assess its validity, achieving a 97% accuracy rate. Additionally, Cronbach's alpha was calculated to determine the reliability of the questionnaire, yielding a value of 0.713, which is considered reasonable and reliable.

The choice of university students as the research sample is inherently controversial. To ensure the reliability of the data and information, the researcher conducted two pilot studies during the research process. In the first pilot, 20 forms were distributed to diverse segments of society, including the educated, teachers, employees, workers, employers, the illiterate, housewives, and members of the armed forces. After the first pilot test, the researcher observed that certain groups, such as the illiterate, workers, and housewives, found the questions and topics difficult to understand. Additionally, some employees and members of the armed forces refused to complete the questionnaire upon learning that it addressed sensitive issues, particularly those concerning the two ruling parties. This feedback highlighted the challenges of engaging a broader segment of society on such politically sensitive matters.

- This prompted the researcher to shift the sample focus to university students for the following reasons: University students generally have a higher comprehension level than other groups, making it easier to understand the questions. It would be even more challenging for different groups if they struggle with comprehension.
- University students are predominantly young and constitute a significant portion of Kurdish society.
- Students are not government employees, so they are more likely to express their opinions openly and freely.

- University students represent a broad cross-section of Kurdish society, encompassing various families, cities, political biases, ideologies, economic backgrounds, and social classes in Kurdistan.

Gender Variable

Despite the study's efforts to achieve gender balance, a tiny disparity is evident as females exhibited a higher level of cooperation in completing the questionnaires compared to males. Hence, the female population constituted 57% of the study sample, while the male participants




FIGURE 1 GENDER VARIABLE OF RESEARCH SAMPLE

accounted for 43% see Figure 1.

Faculty and University Variable

The forms were distributed to participants in the study sample randomly. The researcher conducted on-site visits to institutions and disseminated the surveys in libraries, central cafeterias, and campus courtyards. The forms were submitted to universities in 10 distinct cities within the Kurdistan Region, with five universities located in each of the two distinct political zones. As illustrated in (Figure 2), 22% of the participants are affiliated with the Colleges of Law and Political Sciences, while 31% belong to various departments within the Faculty of Education. Additionally, 10% of the participants are from the College and Faculty of Management and Economics, 23% are from the College and Faculty of Humanities, and 14% are associated with the College and Faculty of Science and Engineering.




FIGURE 2 COLLEGES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE

Residential Variable

As stated in the methodology section, an equal number of forms were delivered to 10 institutions located in ten distinct locations throughout the Kurdistan territory. Three of these colleges were situated in provincial centers, while the remaining were located in various cities and autonomous administrations within the territory. Based on the provided pie chart, it can be observed that 31% of the individuals included in the study resided in urban areas. 46% of the participants resided in the autonomous administrations and districts of the region, while 23% resided in the townships and villages (see Figure 3).




FIGURE 3 RESIDENTIAL LOCATION OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE

Party Affiliation Variable

Concerning the participants' association with political parties, 24% of the respondents opted to withhold their political party affiliation when provided with the opportunity to respond openly.

Based on the study, 52% of the respondents identified themselves as neutral, as shown in the pie chart below. In addition, the table above indicates that the percentage of respondents who consider themselves supporters of opposition parties does not surpass 4%, while the support rate for the ruling parties is 20% (see Figure 4).




FIGURE 4 PARTY AFFILIATION OF PARTICIPANTS

Structural Differentiation

Structural differentiation is a frequently observed aspect of political evolution. As stated before, structural differentiation refers to the separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, as well as the institutions' competence and specialization. Several inquiries were made regarding the involvement of ruling political parties in government institutions, legislative bodies, judicial systems, and military authorities to understand their respective roles.

The executive

This study aims to examine the influence of governing political parties on government operations and institutional matters through the formulation of three key inquiries. The overwhelming majority of respondents hold the view that the two ruling parties have a detrimental impact on the government and institutions, leading to their weakened state.

A majority of respondents, namely sixty-two percent, hold the belief that government officials prioritize the interests of their political parties over those of the government. Twenty-seven percent of residents hold a different opinion, believing that government officials prioritize the affairs and interests of the government and its institutions over those of their political parties. Additionally, 11% of citizens voted neutrally (see Figure 5).




FIGURE 5 THE PRIORITY OF PARTY INTERESTS

One of the key features of political development is the executive authority's capacity to effectively carry out its duties, meet the needs of residents by delivering services and job opportunities, and safeguard their property. Regarding the inquiry about the extent to which leading political parties contribute to the mismanagement of government affairs, the percentage




FIGURE 6 MISMANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

of individuals who perceive the role of the ruling parties as negative is considerably more than in the preceding inquiries. 72% of respondents believe that both ruling parties are implicated in the

mismanagement and corruption of government agencies. However, a mere 16% of respondents held a contrary view, while another 12% of respondents remained neutral (see Figure 6).

There are numerous signs of mismanagement in the government's handling of matters by both ruling parties, including rampant corruption, nepotism, mishandling of the country's economic sector through the confiscation of revenue sources, and deficiencies in delivering essential services and public infrastructure.

The 2020 report from the US State Department emphasizes the participation of high-ranking officials in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) in corrupt practices, suggesting that certain instances of corruption have not been addressed and have become institutionalized. The report further stated that inquiries into corruption are constrained and subject to political interference. (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p.38).

Similarly, a report by the International Crisis Group verifies the ongoing corruption of both ruling parties inside their respective areas of control. As per the research, despite the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) invasion of the Kurdistan Region, declining oil prices, and budget reductions by Baghdad, both parties managed to accumulate wealth in 2014 (Hiltermann, 2023). Both ruling parties exert significant influence over the state administration process in the Kurdistan Region as a result of their historical history. This has allowed them to maintain control over key aspects such as the economy, politics, law, judiciary, and military, which are major contributors to corruption in the region. The heightened influence of both political parties has amplified the potential for nepotism, particularly within families that maintain allegiances to both parties. According to the research, recruitment is typically influenced by political affiliations and family connections rather than individual merit (Pring, 2015, p.3). Attaining a prominent position within the KRG beyond the confines of the KDP or PUK party structure is challenging. The party structure is intricately connected to the commercial sector. It is extremely challenging for a prominent company to operate without any direct connections to other firms and intermediaries (Saleem & Skelton, 2020, p. 6).

In her 2010 book *'The Kurdish Quasi-State, Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq'*, Natali highlights the incompetence and corruption exhibited by both ruling parties, including the mishandling of international aid provided by NGOs and the United Nations. The assistance provided did not enhance the economic infrastructure of the region. Instead, it was

manipulated by the two parties to consolidate their power and gain the support of tribal leaders and the general population, thus bolstering their position (Khalil, 2016, p.32).

Both parties' mismanagement of government affairs is evident in their heavy dependence on the oil industry and their neglect of the industrial and agricultural sectors. This has resulted in an economy that is highly susceptible to risks and vulnerabilities. Over the past few years, the private sector or representatives of political parties have methodically assumed control of the government and sources of income, with both ruling parties playing a significant role in enabling this. Consequently, there has been a decrease in the government's revenue, a significant portion of which is funneled towards firms supported by political parties. The inadequate revenue generation for the public budget has been a primary factor contributing to the government's vulnerability and incapacity to fulfill essential employee rights (such as salaries) and deliver basic services. As an illustration, in a contract between the KRG and a point-to-point camera company, the company will receive 70% of the money while the government will only receive 30%. Numerous additional instances and agreements exist as well. Moreover, other corporations have been granted tax exemptions, which undoubtedly would have served as a significant government revenue stream.

An illustrative instance is provided by a report conducted by the RAND Corporation in collaboration with the Ministries of Health and Planning. The report highlights the deficiencies within the health sector, such as the scarcity or decline of health equipment, an excessive number of patients, and an insufficient quantity of health personnel in terms of both numbers and working hours in public hospitals. According to the report, the private sector employs the same people who are more productive and efficient, but this comes at a higher cost for patients. In the same vein, over a period exceeding three decades, the government has been unsuccessful in delivering and resolving the issues of energy, water, and education in the area (Anthony et al, 2018).

Political development is often associated with the presence of a robust government that is capable of effectively addressing the legitimate needs and requests of its population. The strengths and weaknesses of governments can arise from a multitude of factors. This issue explores the detrimental impact of the unhealthy conflict between the two primary political parties in the region on its overall weakness.

According to the figure provided, 75% of respondents attribute the weak performance of government institutions to the rivalry between the PUK and the KDP. In contrast, a mere 12% of citizens hold a divergent viewpoint, whereas 13% of respondents had no opinion (see Figure 7).




FIGURE 7 WEAKENING OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

The presence of specific attributes in the political landscape of the Kurdistan Region has fostered the perception that both the PUK and the KDP are primarily responsible for the erosion of government institutions. Below are a few of those that are mentioned briefly.

One of the most prominent features of politics in the Kurdistan Region is the existence of two administrations. In 2003, after ten years of separation, civil conflict, and two different administrations, the Kurdistan Region established a unified government. This was achieved through an agreement between the PUK and the KDP, which was the outcome of a strategic agreement between the two political parties (Hama & Abdullah, 2021). Nevertheless, the impact of both regimes may still be observed. Both the KDP and the PUK continue to exert their authority in the respective regions they govern, with the KDP holding power in Erbil and Duhok provinces, and the PUK in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. The government cabinets in the Kurdistan Region have been undermined by the diminished strength of the leaders' spheres of influence from both parties (Wahab, 2023).

The internal revenue and border points are seen as primary sources of contention between the two parties. Each partner possesses complete autonomy regarding the gathering and allocation of these earnings. Each of these groups has successfully taken control of oil and gas fields (Jaff,

2022). This suggests the presence of two administrations that the KRG is incapable of efficiently overseeing. The KDP spokesman asserts that the PUK has been the primary hindrance to the restoration and execution of service projects, encompassing security measures and the appropriation of domestic funds within the province and the entire area. According to the spokesperson of the KDP in (2023), asserts that the PUK has emerged as a substitute for the government, impeding the ability of legitimate institutions to fulfill their responsibilities. Concerning external relationships as part of both ruling parties' struggle to weaken the government, both the KDP and the PUK rely heavily on surrounding countries, with the KDP being dependent on Turkey and the PUK being dependent on Iran. Undoubtedly, this atypical connection has had a detrimental impact on the matter of national cohesion and the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, it has eroded the effectiveness of the programs implemented by local governments in the region. The over-dependence on these two regional groups has resulted in the two parties being the mainstay of these governments' policies, even at the expense of the Kurdish country. As an illustration, Turkey frequently launches attacks on different areas in Sulaymaniyah province, claiming that they are connected to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), but the government fails to take any action. The Iraqi army, supported by Iraqi and Iranian Shiite militias, along with assistance from a faction of the PUK due to its facilitation and links with Iran, resulted in a 51% loss of territory in the region following the 2017 referendum.

The spokesperson for the KRG stated that the actions of a political party in Sulaimani province PUK led to the shutdown of Sulaimani airport, which was subsequently targeted by Turkey in a bombing incident (Adil, 2023). The pervasive influence and intervention of dominant political parties in governmental matters have been consistently seen, making it challenging to discern between ruling parties and the government. One of the problems in the policy characteristics of the Kurdistan Region is that even after the election and formation of the government cabinet, the influence of political parties, especially the ruling parties, remains strong. In contrast, in French democracy, the influence of parties on the government cabinet decreases after the election concludes (Bakhawan, 2013, p. 30).

The analysis by the International Crisis Group highlights that the divergences between the PUK and KDP have posed challenges for the Kurds in reclaiming their influential position in Baghdad (International Crisis Group, 2019). Furthermore, a Foreign Policy assessment published four years later confirmed that the competition between the PUK and the KDP has

diminished the strength of the Kurdistan Region. The paper highlights that the region's influence has diminished, even in Baghdad. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of Washington exerting pressure on the PUK to restrict its collaboration with Iran (Alaaldin, 2023).

The legislature

The legislature, such as Parliament, plays a crucial role in democratic systems as it acts as a representative body for all citizens, including both the governing and opposition parties. The main roles of parliament are to pass laws and oversee the government by scrutinizing their activities, ensuring their responsibility, and questioning them (Stapenhurst et al, 2006, pp.3-5). This topic explores three key questions on the parliament's decision-making capabilities, the extent to which parliamentarians align with or oppose the interests of the public, and the functions of parliament, specifically in terms of government oversight and establishing relationships with the governing political parties.

There is uncertainty about the extent to which parliament can pass legislation that contradicts the desires of the ruling political parties, raising doubts about the independence of parliaments in this matter. The figure below illustrates the prevailing skepticism, as the majority of respondents hold this viewpoint with a percentage of 52%. Conversely, 21% of the participants maintain the belief that parliament members can enact laws without seeking approval from their respective parties, while 17% of them remain impartial and unsure regarding the level of autonomy inside the parliament (see Figure 8).




FIGURE 8 MAKING LAWS

The participants' uncertainty regarding the ability of parliament to pass laws that go against the wishes of the dominant political parties may be due to the overwhelming influence of the ruling political forces over the institutions, including the parliament. The members of parliament, or MPs, are constrained by their party's narrow political agenda and are unable to stray from their party's programs and policies. While members of parliament are elected by their parties and are obligated to follow their party's ideas and plans, they may nonetheless hold divergent stances on certain national matters or decisions that prioritize the public welfare.

As previously stated, in several parliaments of developed Western nations, Members of Parliament, both from the ruling and opposition parties on some issues, have reached a consensus on legislation with a national scope, regardless of whether the measure was initiated by the ruling or opposition parties. Rarely has this type of thought been observed in the Kurdistan Parliament. Regardless of the political decisions made by their respective parties, the Members of Parliament have aligned themselves with that particular path. The forthcoming section will elucidate the factors contributing to the absence of these instances in the Kurdistan Parliament. For instance, the parliamentary vote on the draft constitution and the electoral legislation did not occur, although it was much desired by the majority of the Kurdish population and was a tangible measure toward establishing the Kurdistan Region as an official institution. Nevertheless, the event has been delayed as a result of conflicting party interests and competition.

Draw Media's research (2021) identifies political party dominance and entrenched power in parliament as the primary contributors to the parliament's ineffectiveness. It highlights that MPs prioritize their political party affiliations over representing the interests of the public, albeit to varying degrees. Consequently, they amass an artificial majority to support any desired legislation, ensuring its passage regardless of the party or government's intentions. Conversely, any proposals that do not align with their objectives will be obstructed and disregarded.

When it comes to prioritizing the public interest of individuals over narrow party objectives, a significant majority of participants, 61%, believe that MPs do not give precedence to the needs of the people over the needs of their parties. This indicates that a significant percentage of participants expressed skepticism regarding legislators prioritizing the welfare of the public over their political affiliations. However, 25% of respondents expressed confidence that Members of Parliament would act autonomously in their constituents' best interests, despite the influence and dominance of their political parties. while, 14% of the participants remained

neutral, indicating a state of uncertainty or ambiguity on the extent to which lawmakers prioritize the interests of the people (see Figure 9).




FIGURE 9 PRIORITIZING PUBLIC INTERESTS

Moreover, parliamentary accountability is widely seen as a crucial aspect of parliament's role. It is a notable feature of national legislation. Typically, a parliamentary question is posed by a parliament member or a collective of parliamentarians to a government official with the purpose of scrutinizing and ensuring government responsibility. Alternatively, it could encompass additional methods of holding individuals accountable, such as interpellation, the establishment of investigative committees, and the presentation of reports (Martin & Rozenberg, 2014). Also, the media and civil society organizations have a crucial role in reporting events and raising issues when it comes to holding the cabinet accountable in parliament.

According to the data in the figure below, 57% of the respondents perceive the Kurdistan Parliament as feeble and inept in its capacity to hold the administration responsible. Conversely, 27% of the population holds a different viewpoint and expresses no skepticism regarding the parliament's capacity to hold government cabinets responsible in the Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, 16% of individuals hold a neutral stance on the matter (see Figure 10).




FIGURE 10 PARLIAMENTARY ACCOUNTABILITY

Based on an analytical report by Draw Media (2021), none of the 282 presidents, vice presidents, and ministers in the five parliamentary periods spanning from 1992 to 2018 had lost confidence and withdrawn from their positions. The report expresses astonishment at the outcome and asserts that it is unjust that a minister has not been found guilty of any transgressions, corruption, or incompetence over the course of thirty years in government, despite the numerous setbacks and fluctuations experienced by this region, including the occurrence of a civil war, mismanagement, and corruption. Despite several fuel, health, educational, and cultural issues, the residents of Kurdistan have been unable to access sufficient energy, roads, and drinking water. In recent times, the lack of economic self-sufficiency was accompanied by the inability to conduct a referendum and the relinquishment of 51% of the region's land. However, no one can be held accountable for this predicament. This pattern has persisted not only in the current parliamentary session but also in all five previous sessions of parliament.

In addition, according to studies from the Pay Institute, ministers and prime ministers have been overlooked when it comes to being called for a parliamentary inquiry. In Report No. 3 of 2015, a mere four out of the 15 ministers who were summoned for investigation were in attendance (Pay Institute, 2015, p.45). Moreover, as stated in Report No. 10 of the Pay Institute (2022) on the Monitoring and Evaluation of Parliamentary Work, it has become normal for

ministerial cabinet members to disregard parliamentary questions. In addition, concerning another aspect of legislative authority in the annual issuance of the budget, the Kurdistan parliament has been unable to effectively oversee the government. The budget proposals have not been presented to the parliament for a decade, allowing the executive branch to operate independently without any form of oversight or accountability (Pay Institute, 2023, p.23).

The Judiciary

The judiciary is widely seen as a paramount authority inside political systems, particularly in democratic ones. The executive and legislative branches are anticipated to possess a political aspect; however, it is imperative for this branch to maintain its autonomy. This arm of government operates independently from the executive and legislative departments, with the primary objectives of upholding the rule of law and safeguarding individual liberties and rights. A robust court is crucial for upholding the tenets of democracy and safeguarding civil and political rights, as well as ensuring the protection of numerous freedoms. The judiciary ensures the protection of both the rights of persons in relation to one another and the rights of individuals in relation to the authorities (Agbor, 2015, pp.147-149). This issue explores the judiciary and the rule of law in the Kurdistan Region, as well as the degree of influence exerted by the ruling parties over both.

To ensure the rights and liberties of individuals, it is essential that the courts remain free from any external influence or intrusion. The autonomy of the courts enables them to render unbiased judgments exclusively based on legal principles and factual evidence in each case, so guaranteeing fairness, safeguarding human rights, and maintaining the supremacy of the legal system.

A significant majority of respondents, including 72%, believe that the courts in the Kurdistan Region are subject to influence and control by the dominant political parties, therefore compromising their independence. Conversely, a mere 14% of the population holds the belief that the courts operate without any external influence, while another 14% do not have a definitive position on the matter (see Figure 11).




FIGURE 11 INDEPENDENCE OF COURTS

Multiple publications have shown the absence of judicial autonomy in the Kurdistan Region, as well as the intrusion of the dominant political parties in the court's decision-making and operations. For example, the Democracy and Human Rights Development Center (DHRD) regularly issues studies on the courts' independence and their role in safeguarding human rights in the Kurdistan area.

Report No. 4 of the Court Support Project, conducted by the Democracy and Human Rights Development Center (DHRD) in 2010, highlights over 50 instances of political parties and affiliated corporations interfering with and disregarding court judgments and proceedings. In report No. 10, highlights the persistent and deteriorating instances of legal infractions and the absence of autonomy in the Kurdistan Regional Courts. As to the study, there has been a rise in the number of infractions and the concerned parties have not taken any proactive measures. Additionally, it highlights the decline in the autonomy of the judiciary and emphasizes that the majority of transgressions are perpetrated by the executive branch and political parties. Furthermore, the report highlights the blatant intervention of political parties in the selection of Court of Appeal judges and students of the judicial institute (Democracy and Human Rights Development [DHRD], 2017, p.3).

Similarly, an article published by the Tahrir Institute highlights the prevailing control and impact of political parties, particularly the PUK and KDP, on the judicial and court system. The distributive approach of evenly dividing resources between the two parties has also had an

impact on the courts. Without the backing of a political party, it is exceedingly challenging for a judge to secure victory in the judiciary (Chomani, 2019).

Despite the violation of court orders and the undermining of the rule of law, the PUK and KDP occasionally use wanted individuals in the media for political and propaganda motives. Recently, the government has provided sanctuary to several suspects (anti-terrorism police affiliated with the PUK) who were found guilty by the Erbil court for the 2022 killing of another anti-terrorism officer named Hawkar Jaf (Peregraf, 2023).

Moreover, the concept of the rule of law, also referred to as the supremacy of law, is a basic principle in a democratic society. It mandates that all individuals, institutions, and businesses, both public and private, are held legally responsible.

Regarding this matter, as depicted in the figure below, 66% of the participants express skepticism towards the rule of law and hold the belief that there is a disparity in its application for all individuals. Conversely, a mere 23% of individuals hold the belief that the principle of law is implemented impartially, without any bias towards officials or ordinary citizens, and 11% of participants expressed a neutral stance (see Figure 12).




FIGURE 12 SUPERIORITY OF LAWS

Based on a survey conducted in a scientific study, an overwhelming majority of respondents (81%) believe that the court rulings in the Kurdistan Region lack fairness and equality, particularly when it comes to treating the poor and the powerful. The survey also revealed that people's lack of trust in the courts and their rulings stems not only from discriminatory decision-making; but also from the failure to enforce decisions even when they are made against those

in positions of power, sometimes due to political party backing or other factors (Sadq, 2020, pp.181-182).

The findings of the DHRD consistently highlight the absence of legal supremacy in the Kurdistan Region. Their ninth report mentions the decision to apprehend 258 individuals implicated in the Anfal case, with only three of them being detained six years after the decision (Democracy and Human Rights Development [DHRD], 2016, p.7).

According to a survey by the Pay Institute, a mere 23 out of the 406 laws passed in the last 30 years, which accounts for approximately 5.66 percent, have been put into effect. All other laws are either transitory and not now in effect, or have been violated and not enforced as intended, or have not been enforced at all. The study also stated that the purpose of the enacted laws was to prolong the duration of parliament, augment the obligations on citizens, and address other uncomplicated and subordinate matters. Moreover, concerning execution, the government has enacted laws that served its interests while disregarding others (Pay Institute, 2024).

The report identifies various factors that contribute to the failure to enforce laws and the prevalence of violations. The most prominent factor is the lack of autonomy in the courts, prosecutor general's office, and judiciary. Additionally, the dominance of political parties, the absence of a clear separation between party power and the government, the influence of party-affiliated armed forces, and the lack of independence and impartiality in the police and internal affairs forces are significant contributors. The report also highlights numerous other reasons (Pay Institute, 2024).

Other Institutions

This section is related to institutions other than the three authorities previously listed. The military forces, security institutions, and civil society organizations have a significant impact on solidifying and enhancing the pillars of democracy, particularly when they operate with professionalism and independence from the influence and control of other institutions or political parties.

To assess the degree of influence exerted by the reigning political parties on these institutions, the respondents were asked a series of questions.

The initial topic that was examined was the military. Ensuring civilian power over the military forces is a crucial tenet of democracy and political progress. The importance of this matter extends beyond the mere lack of a military coup. Maintaining democracy becomes challenging

when the armed services operate independently of elected civilian representatives. The military poses a significant domestic threat to any democratic society due to its capacity and resources for repression. Having elected civilian representatives in control of the armed forces decreases the likelihood of coups and their dominance, and these representatives also serve as protectors and strengtheners of democratic values (Dahl, 1998).

In addition, civilian officials must possess sufficient authority over the armed forces. This authority should encompass the ability to establish overall policy without any interference from the military. Furthermore, civilian officials should have the power to determine the objectives and overall structure of national defense, develop and execute defense policy, and oversee the implementation of military policy (Eldem, 2019, p. 2). The allocation of power between civilian authorities and military leaders is the mechanism by which civilian control over the armed forces is administered and maintained. Civil authority governs policies aimed at achieving national objectives, whereas military personnel handle things such as military operations, internal organization, and operational planning (Bland, 1999, pp. 16-17).

In this regard, the study reveals that a substantial 79% of respondents believe that the military forces lack independence and instead adhere to the directives of the ruling political parties. Conversely, a mere 15% of the population holds the belief that the military forces are subject to civilian control, while 6% of participants expressed uncertainty or maintained a neutral stance (see Figure 13).




FIGURE 13 ARMED FORCES INDEPENDENCE

Based on a study by Sadq (2020), 77% of participants expressed the belief that the military forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government have closer relations with political parties rather than the government. The reason for this close relationship is that they were hired with the backing and endorsement of the party, therefore they prioritized loyalty to the party over loyalty to the nation (2020, p. 169, p.170). The State Department report highlights that the PUK and KDP own separate Peshmerga armed units that are under their respective jurisdiction. These forces are commanded by the two parties (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p.2).

Moreover, the Foreign Policy Research Institute's paper highlights the partitioning of the Peshmerga forces into two distinct political zones, namely green and yellow, by the PUK and KDP. The paper also highlights that although there have been attempts to bring them back together, there are still significant measures that need to be implemented (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023).

The United States and Britain have made continuous international efforts to reform and reintegrate the Peshmerga forces as part of the international alliance. During an interview, the Minister of Peshmerga Affairs emphasized that the reformation of the Peshmerga forces is a prerequisite for the ongoing provision of international help and support from the United States and its allies. Furthermore, he highlights that the absence of integration among the forces is primarily due to political factors rather than tactical considerations (Rudaw TV, 2022).

Furthermore, the security forces including police and intelligence services must be subordinate to elected civilian representatives. Based on the survey findings, 75% of participants hold the belief that both governing political parties employ the security forces to further their own party objectives. Just 11% of the population perceives these forces as both national and professional, while 14% maintain a neutral stance (see Figure 14).




FIGURE 14 THE INDEPENDENCE OF SECURITY FORCES

According to the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdistan Region is authorized to keep a separate security force from the Iraqi federal security forces. Within this structure, both the PUK and KDP both maintain independent Asayish (security forces) under their own authority. (U.S. Department of State, 2020, p.2). The KRG Security Council, formally constituted in 2012, has members from the ruling parties and has not convened any meetings since its establishment. In addition, the members of the security council seldom exhibit collaboration. Consequently, when a security issue arises in one of the zones, the council's security officials communicate with each other mostly through statements and provide responses to one another (Draw Media, 2020).

Another aspect that was examined was the existence and efficacy of civil society organizations. Civil society is widely seen as a beneficial element in the process of strengthening democracy. Civil society has been variously described, but there is a widespread consensus among researchers regarding its key attributes, including its status as a non-state entity and the voluntary participation of its members. Ernest Gellner defines civil society as a collection of various non-governmental organizations that have enough power to balance the state. While these organizations do not hinder the state from maintaining peace and resolving conflicts between major interests, they can prevent the state from exerting excessive control and fragmenting the rest of society. Larry Diamond defines civil society as the domain of structured social existence that is accessible, voluntary, self-sustaining, partially independent from the

government, and governed by a legal framework or a set of commonly agreed-upon principles (Diamond, 1997, p.6).

Civil society serves as an intermediary between the populace and the governing bodies, safeguarding the rights and welfare of citizens against potential abuses of power by the government. This is likely to happen if they operate independently and their members work willingly, free from political interests and interference.

Regarding civil society organizations in the Kurdistan Region and their affiliation with political parties, a majority of 62% of respondents express skepticism about the independence of these organizations, such as teachers and student unions. They believe that political parties exert influence and control over these organizations. Conversely, a mere 20% of individuals have confidence in the autonomy of these institutions when it comes to executing their tasks, while 18% are completely unaware of the operational procedures of such organizations (see Figure 15).




FIGURE 15 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

An inherent issue with youth and student organizations is their susceptibility to the influence and manipulation of the governing political parties. These groups prioritize the interests of ruling parties over the needs and desires of the youth, who are the primary and most significant segment of society (Bakhawan 2013, p.139). Based on a 2020 survey, 72% of respondents perceive that civil society organizations are established by political parties and are therefore bound by the policies and decisions of these parties, with limited ability to diverge from their directives. There is a constant and intense struggle for dominance within these groups. While

civil society organizations may not have the explicit goal of acquiring power, their members consistently seek to achieve influence through political parties (Sadq, 2020, pp. 210-211). The report from the US State Department highlights the strong connection between civil society organizations and political parties, with the latter providing financial support to the former (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The provision of financial and political assistance to civil society organizations by the governing political parties expands their network of beneficiaries while simultaneously restricting the scope of their operations and freedom of speech (Saleem & Skelton, 2020, p.25).

When an organization or institution relies on financial assistance from a political party rather than the government, it lacks independent financial resources and is therefore unable to act autonomously. Instead, it is subject to the influence of the supporting parties' policies and ideologies. Furthermore, it is particularly problematic when individuals within the organization perceive their role as a means of generating personal revenue and exerting dominance, rather than as a volunteer endeavor aimed at benefiting the public. This will result in the establishment of political party hegemony and the enforcement of a specific ideology, rather than fostering a space for public discourse and freedom.

The questionnaire also examined the participants' level of patriotism as a final theme. Patriotism can be defined as a profound affection for one's nation and its inhabitants, along with a sense of duty to safeguard and shield it from potential harm. Regarding the sentiment of patriotism among Kurdish individuals, 63% of the participants say that the governing political parties have been unsuccessful in fostering a sense of patriotism among individuals. Conversely, a quarter of the population holds the view that both political parties have heightened the feeling of patriotism among the populace, while 12% remain undecided and adopt a neutral stance (see Figure 16).




FIGURE 16 SENSE OF PATRIOTISM

In a study performed by Sheekar Company for study and Research, over 50% of participants hold the belief that their status will improve if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is dissolved and the central government in Baghdad takes control. After a century of struggle, the pursuit of freedom and self-governance has resulted in a profound feeling of hopelessness for the Kurdish government. Remarkably, the research emphasizes that this progress took place only six years following the Kurdistan independence referendum, in which more than 92 percent of the populace voted in favor (Sheekar for Research and Survey, 2023).

Discussion

Overall, as indicated by the survey results, the role of the two ruling political parties does not contribute positively to the process of political development, particularly in terms of structural differentiation. Both parties exert significant influence on the strengths and weaknesses of government institutions by assuming control over state institutions. As previously noted, structural differentiation refers not only to the separation of powers but also to the requirement that each institution—whether judiciary, legislature, or executive—maintains its distinct characteristics and operates efficiently and professionally. No authority should overstep its boundaries or interfere in the responsibilities and functions of another institution or authority. In the Kurdistan Region, it has been observed that the two ruling parties exert significant influence and control over the various powers and institutions, leading to interference and dominance. This has prevented these institutions from carrying out their duties professionally and independently, as they are constrained by the hegemony and interests of the ruling parties.

Undoubtedly, this interference in institutional affairs is designed to safeguard the interests of the two ruling parties. In the realm of governance, for instance, by controlling revenues (both oil and non-oil, domestic and foreign) and the state bureaucracy, the ruling parties have established a deep-rooted network of patronage and consolidated their power. This has resulted in government decisions and policies being shaped to serve the interests of the parties and individuals within them. While the use of political funds reflects the mismanagement of government affairs and corruption, it simultaneously enables the ruling parties to maintain their strength by distributing funds and securing support from opposition groups. Additionally, they have established a powerful media presence that can manipulate public opinion to align with their objectives. Moreover, the unhealthy competition between the two ruling parties has undermined the strength of the government, largely due to the lack of national vision and strategic foresight on the part of these parties in pursuing genuine nation-building efforts.

Regarding the legislature, both ruling parties exert such significant influence over the institution that any oversight or legislative activity must be coordinated and approved by both parties before proceeding. This is largely because both parties hold a majority in parliament, allowing them to control legislative processes through their factions. Additionally, this influence is reinforced by the ruling parties' control over the bureaucracy and armed forces. For instance, in 2015, when a parliamentary majority was on the verge of forming against the KDP regarding the presidential law, the KDP responded by forcibly closing parliament for two years and preventing the speaker from returning to Erbil. This illustrates how the parties leverage their control to undermine parliamentary processes when their power is threatened.

Despite a long history of political opposition, government formation in the Kurdistan Region is based on agreements between the two ruling parties, wherein the minister from one party serves as the deputy to the minister from the other party. This arrangement has resulted in both parties disregarding the actions of each other's ministers and senior officials, ultimately weakening parliamentary accountability. Moreover, both ruling parties refrain from sending senior party cadres to parliament, opting instead to send lower-ranking members, while senior officials occupy key government positions. As a result, these lower-level parliamentary representatives must consult party leadership for decision-making. In essence, lower-ranking cadres in parliament lack the authority to hold senior government officials accountable, further diminishing effective oversight.

Regarding the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, both ruling parties resist the establishment of a higher authority capable of holding them accountable. The independence of the courts has been called into question as judges are often appointed with the backing of party interests, making it challenging for individuals not aligned with the ruling parties to become judges. This undermines the impartiality of the judicial system.

Regarding the armed forces and security forces, both are fully controlled by the ruling parties, directly tied to the survival of their political power. By maintaining control over these forces, the ruling parties ensure their continued dominance, even if they lose electoral support. In other words, a political party lacking control over armed forces is more likely to weaken and lose influence, whereas a party with such control can maintain its power regardless of election outcomes. Furthermore, both ruling parties seek to maintain full control over civil society organizations, as these organizations serve as vital bridges between the public and authorities. If allowed to operate freely, civil society organizations could exert significant influence on the populace and shape public opinion on a variety of issues, which poses a potential challenge to the parties' dominance.

Finally, the inability of the government and other institutions, such as parliament and the judiciary, to perform their duties professionally has significantly weakened the people's sense of patriotism. Citizens no longer view these institutions as serving their interests but rather as tools in the hands of political parties and a select few individuals, working for the benefit of these parties instead of protecting and addressing the needs of the public. In this context, a significant political gap may emerge between the people and the authorities, which could negatively impact the political and security stability of the Kurdistan Region in the future. This disconnect risks fostering distrust and discontent, further destabilizing the region.

Conclusion

Structural differentiation is a key aspect of political development, involving the separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary power and the specialization of institutions. The research investigates the role of ruling political parties in government and its institutions' affairs. The majority of respondents believe that the two ruling parties are not positive and cause the weakness of the government and institutions. The majority of respondents believe that government officials prioritize their political parties' interests over those of the government.

The strength of executive authority in carrying out its work and responding to citizens' demands is a characteristic of political development.

The Kurdistan Parliament's incompetence in legislating beyond the will of ruling political parties is attributed to political party dominance and deep power. MPs practice politics with a narrow party vision, unable to deviate from their party policies. This lack of consensus on national issues and decisions serves the public interest. Most respondents believe lawmakers prioritize the needs of the people over their parties, while a quarter are confident that MPs will work independently. The region has faced numerous failures and ups and downs, including civil war, waste, corruption, and poor performance. The Kurdistan parliament has also been unable to hold the government accountable for issuing the budget annually.

The judiciary is a crucial authority in any political system, especially in democratic systems. It plays a vital role in maintaining the rule of law and defending individual liberties. The rule of law is a fundamental tenet of democratic societies, yet two-thirds of respondents doubt its implementation. The lack of implementation of laws and high rate of violations are attributed to several reasons, including the lack of independence of courts, prosecutor general, and judiciary, the dominance of political parties, separation of party power from the government, armed forces, and police and internal affairs forces.

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جیاوازی پیکهاتهیی وهک نیشاندهری گهشهسهندنی سیاسی له ههریمی کوردستان-عێراق: رۆلی ههر دوو پارتە سیاسیه دهسهلاتداره که

پوخته

گهشهسهندنی سیاسی ئاماژهیه بۆ پرۆسهی ئهفراندن و به دامهزراندن و رێکخراوه سیاسیهکان و کاریگهریی ئهو رێکخراوانه که به راددهیهکی زۆر پشت بهستوون به ئاستی پشتگیری چین و توێژه جیاچیاکانی کۆمهڵگاوه. ئهم پرۆسهیه کاریگهره به جیاوازی پیکهاتهیی که ههریهکه له یهکسانی و توانایی سیستهمی سیاسی له خۆگۆنجانن، چارمههرکردنی گرفت و پرسهکان لهخۆدهگرێ. زانایانی سیاسی بۆچوونی جیاوازیان ههیه لهسههر نیشانهکانی گهشهسهندنی سیاسی، که دیارترینیان بریتیه له جیاوازی پیکهاتهیی. ئهم توێژینهوهیه ههولێکه بۆ پێوانهکردن

وهه‌ئسەنگاندنی کاربگه‌ری هه‌ردوو پارتی ده‌سه‌لاتداری هه‌ریمی کوردستان (پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان) و (یه‌کیتی نیشتمانی کوردستان) له‌ گه‌شه‌سەندنی سیاسی هه‌ریمی کوردستان پشت به‌ست به‌ ئه‌نجامدانی راپرسی له‌و بواره‌دا. به‌ لێکۆڵینه‌وه‌ له‌و پرسیاره‌، پاشخانیکێ تیۆری له‌سه‌ر گه‌شه‌سەندنی سیاسی و جیاکاری پێکهاته‌یی پێشکەش ده‌کری و دواتر به‌شی میتۆدۆلۆژی و شیکاری ئه‌نجامه‌کانی راپرسییه‌که‌ ده‌خزێنرۆو. له‌ راپرسییه‌که‌دا ٥٥٠ قوتابی له‌ ده‌ زانکۆی حکومی جیاوازی شارمه‌کانی کوردستان له‌ چینی کۆمه‌لایه‌تی ئابوری جۆراوجۆر وه‌رگیران. پرسیارنامه‌که‌ به‌ به‌کاره‌ینانی پێوه‌رمه‌کانی ئیندیکیسی خانه‌ی نازادی دروستکراوه‌ و به‌سه‌ر به‌شارداریبووانی فاکه‌لتی و زانکۆ جیاوازه‌کاندا دابه‌شکراوه‌.

وشه‌ی کلێلییه‌کان: گه‌شه‌سەندنی سیاسی، جیاوازی پێکهاته‌یی، پارتی دیموکراتی کوردستان، یه‌کیتی نیشتمانی کوردستان، هه‌ریمی کوردستان-عێراق، پرسیارنامه‌.

التمایز الهیکلي كمؤشر على التطور السياسي في إقليم كردستان العراق: دور الحزبين السياسيين الحاكمين

خلاصة

يشير التنمية السياسي إلى عملية إنشاء وتأسيس المنظمات والإجراءات السياسية، حيث تعتمد فعالية المنظمة إلى حد كبير على مستوى الدعم الذي تتلقاه من مختلف شرائح المجتمع. ويتأثر هذا الأمر بالتمایز الهيكلي، والسعي إلى تحقيق المساواة، وقدرة النظام السياسي على التكيف والتعامل والتعديل. تختلف آراء علماء السياسة حول مؤشرات التنمية السياسية، ويعد التمايز الهيكلي أحد أبرز هذه المؤشرات. تهدف هذه المقالة إلى تقييم تأثير الحزبين السياسيين المهيمنين، وهما الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني والاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني، على التنمية السياسية في كردستان، باستخدام استبيان. وللإجابة على هذا السؤال، تم تقديم خلفية نظرية حول التطور السياسي والتمایز الهيكلي، يليه قسم للمنهجية وتحليل لنتائج المسح. شملت الدراسة 550 طالباً من عشر جامعات حكومية في إقليم كردستان، يمثلون مجموعة متنوعة من الخلفيات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية. تم إنشاء الاستبيان باستخدام معايير مؤشر دار الحرية وتم توزيعه على المشاركين في مختلف الكليات والجامعات.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التنمية السياسي، التمايز الهيكلي، الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني، الاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني، إقليم كردستان العراق، الاستبيان.