

<https://www.doi.org/10.31918/twejer.2033.27>

e-ISSN (2617-0752)

p-ISSN (2617-0744)



Terrorism and Iraqi National Security 2003– 2017: the Socio–Economic and Cultural Losses

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Abstract

This paper is entitled "Terrorism and Iraqi National Security 2003-2017: the Socio-Economic and Cultural Losses". It discusses the impact of the acts of terrorist groups, especially by Al Qaeda and ISIS on Iraqi national security. Besides, it highlights the impact of terrorist groups on the Iraqi national unity, and socio-cultural sectors of Iraq's society. The findings of our paper show the wide range extent of damages done by the two mentioned terrorist organizations on Iraq's national security, in terms of cost, time, and quality. Besides, the terrorist acts, especially that of ISIS, had a profound effect on Iraq's peace, stability, and had disrupted the social cohesion of Iraqi society.

Keywords: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, National Security, Culture, and Iraqi Society

Terrorism and Iraqi National Security 2003-2017: the Socio-Economic and Cultural Losses

1. Introduction

During the period 2006-2014, the terrorist organizations of al-Qaeda and ISIS had rapid growth in Iraq, and their terrorist acts had a profound impact on Iraqi national security in many terms. While for many of the resurgence of Sunni insurgency in Iraq that Allies experienced especially in 2004-2007 may come as a surprise, it had been brewing since the U.S. pullout in 2011 in the Sunni-controlled areas of Iraq. Later incarnations of a feared organization of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ramped up its visible presence in provinces like al-Anbar, Ninawa, Diyala, Salah Adin and even control over certain towns. For example, since 2012, in the town of Sahdiya, Northeast of Baghdad in Diyala province, the AQI had already established its presence there (Gomes and Mikhael., 2018).

AQI dominated a coalition of Salafist groups subsequently adopted in October 2006 under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS). After of few months of careful preparations, ISIS openly declared expansion to war-torn Syria in April 2013, and they changed the name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. In January 2014, Baghdad effectively lost control over strategic areas of the al-Anbar province. At the beginning of June 2014, ISIS units started a coordinated large-scale military operation in Northwestern Iraq, and quickly swept through cities like Mosul, Samarra, Fallujah, and Tikrit. Besides, they threatened to march on Baghdad (El Damanhoury., 2017).

Iraqi security forces (ISF) literally fell apart and fled in panic in the direction to Baghdad in tens of thousands leaving most of the weaponry behind facing reportedly just hundreds of ISIS militants. Advancing ISIS units counting ten thousand at best were in many places welcomed by the Sunni population as saviors from Rawafidh, which is a derogative term used for Shiites by Salafists. On June 19, 2014, the official spokesperson of ISIS Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, heralded a new era of international jihad. ISIS declared its own Caliphate: "—O soldiers of the Islamic State, Allah, ordered us with jihad and promised us with a victory but He did not make us responsible for the victory. Indeed, Allah blessed you today with this victory thus announced the Caliphate in compliance with the order of Allah." These rapid and alarming developments had left a profound impact on Iraqi society in many regards (Kaválek, 2015).

Objectives

The followings are the main objectives of the research:

It is for studying the brief background profile of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

It is going to analyze the impact of Al-Qaeda and ISIS on the Socio-Economic and Cultural of the Iraqi National Security.

Research Problem

This research was intended to fill the gaps, through evaluating and analyzing terrorist acts, in Iraq especially by Al-Qaeda and ISIS which were affected by the Iraqi National Security from 2003 to 2017 and tries to focus on hitherto aspects of the devastating economic losses, cultural damages, and social disruptions that the

terrorist acts have created and their overall harm to the national security of Iraq.

Research Questions

The main question that the paper will try to address is what makes both Al-Qaeda and ISIS so socially destructive? Was their ideology or the feeling of alienation and repression in the hand of the Shiite-dominated elite in Baghdad that made people in the Sunni triangle initially receptive to this form of Terrorism? This article also investigates a secondary issue why did Al-Qaeda and ISIS use extreme particularly brutality towards the religious minorities in the areas which fell under their control?

1.4 The importance of research

The significance of the topic under instigation lies in its focus on hitherto not discussed aspects of the devastating socio-economic impact that the al-Qaeda and ISIS had on Iraqi society. Also, understanding these socio-economic effects of the terrorist acts is essential for re-building the post-conflict civil society in Iraq. Moreover, the research will give insights to academics and investigators to obtain accurate findings associated with their investigation.

1.5 Methodology

In the current research, we have used, in general, a qualitative approach to data gathering. Besides, we have utilized the relevant primary sources in presenting the data while carrying out content analysis. The gathering data in the field would have enriched the paper greatly; this was attainable due to time constraints, security concerns, and access problems. However, our access to the

literature in several languages has, to a certain extent made up for this shortcoming.

1.6 The Structure of Research

In presenting data, the article gives the first historical background of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Then we introduce the ideological roots of both organizations and their organizational structure, which account for how the brutality they committed. We have also allocated sections for the economic losses, cultural damages, and social disruptions that the terrorist acts have created and their overall harm to the national security of Iraq.

2. Historical Background of al-Qaeda and ISIS

As the terror groups (Al-Qaeda and ISIS) infiltrated Iraq, explosions and bombings along with suicide attacks, became part of a frequent phenomenon that Iraqis expected their occurrences. Those terror groups were active, focused on destabilizing Iraq and start a civil war among various sectors of the Iraqi population. They had a different ideology, Strategy, as well as operational capacities due to their financial and military strength. The leaders of these two terror groups were competing, to cause maximum damages and to align the masses under their flags. For that reason, they were diverse in their implementing the most vicious and heinous terrorist crimes only to stand out and be seen as more fearsome than the other. This technique presented new challenges to Iraqi National security, and the random terror strikes neither they followed a given pattern, nor did they have any respect for civilian life. The ramification of these terror activities affected the civil life, the country's GNP, and, to some degree, affected the degrees of

national unity among various groups of the Iraqi nationals (Styszynski, 2014).

2.1 Al-Qaeda

By now, the Arabic word 'Al-Qaeda' is well known in the international media, since it is frequently used. The actual meaning of the word, 'Al Qaeda' refers to a 'base' and that it is the name of a terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden¹. Some scholars do not agree with this translation of the word because of the different meanings and the various activities done by this terror group. It is also worth noting that this terror group cannot be labelled as an 'organization' because of its shadowy structure. Al Qaeda may best be described as a highly complex entity that, in organizational terms, appears to be a movement or a 'network of networks' and affiliates. Additionally, it appears that these groups continuously change their shape, size, and their affiliations (Bakker and Boer, 2007).

In October 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi² that sourced from Bayat al-Imam, which started in Jordan in the 1990s. The group first associated with al Qaeda's senior leadership in 1999 and fought alongside al Qaeda in Afghanistan in late 2001. The group then moved to Iraq and started galvanizing the Iraqi insurgency from 2003 to 2007. Since the group was more into divisiveness, used very brutal terrorist activities, and failed to deliver any gains, their popularity diminished gradually. The death of Zarqawi in 2006 and his successors were major blows to this terror organization. However, they proved to be resilient and carried out fewer and fewer but high profile attacks in vulnerable areas of Iraq (Kirdar, 2011).

Based on several of its publications and literature, the ideology of al-Qaeda covers the following three principles: A) Muslims are under attack everywhere. B) Only al-Qaeda and its followers are fighting the oppressors of Islam. C) If you are not supporting al-Qaeda, then you are supporting the oppressors (note the exclusionary nature of these statements – this is key). For that reason, the word of Jihad³ and Takfir⁴ are two main bases for Al Qaeda's activities (Quiggin, 2009).

The Strategy of Al-Qaeda was to establish a caliphate in Iraq, but only as an eventual goal. In the 2000s, al-Qaeda affiliates proposed creating emirates in Iraq to become the building blocks for a future caliphate. General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, described AQI's strategies in June 2010, when its capabilities were minimal. He noted, "al-Qaeda in Iraq... hasn't changed. They want the complete failure of the government in Iraq. They want to establish a caliphate in Iraq" (Lewis, 2013).

Moreover, Al Qaeda's Strategy to drive the U.S. out of Muslim lands is to wage an extended campaign of terror causing substantial physical, political, and economic damage that would force the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq (Knights, 2013).

Al Qaeda has little tolerance for Shiites and other minorities, and it views the U.S. and the western cultures as the greater enemies. Their leadership has warned against sectarian killings and the alienation of Muslims. This was the warning message from Zawahiri⁵ to Zarqawi to halt its attacks on the Shiite civilians since it remains unjustified by other Muslims (Wright, 2016).

2.2 ISIS

To understand the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known by many other names such as ISIL, Daesh, and Islamic State) and the reasons behind its existence, its goals, and why it commits such terrible violence, one needs to understand the tangled story of how it came about. The group began in a universal form. In these years since, it has been shaped by and has at moments helped to shape the conflicts, physical and ideological, of the Middle East, and it has brought chaos and death to it (Osaherumwen and Mutunrayo, 2013).

A root of ISIS is traceable to the late Jordanian national Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and his allegiance to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda in 2004. The AQI became a major insurgency force in Iraq until the demise of Zarqawi via a U.S. airstrike in 2006 and his predecessor Abu Ayyub Al Masri⁶ and Abu Omar al Baghdadi in 2010 by a joint coalition and Iraqi forces. The AQI name was later changed by Al Masri to become ISI, and Abu Baker Al Baghdadi⁷ changed it once again to become ISIL and led the new terror organization (Ningthoujam, 2014)

The two Arabic words "Takfir and Jihad" are two principles of ISIS's ideology and its goal has always been to govern the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria and to expand to other Muslim territories by accepting pledges of allegiance from local jihadist groups. At times more than a hundred groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS, and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, ISIS, in particular, has always tried to extend the caliphate⁸ realm by occupying and destabilizing other territories, to make them part of the Caliphate, and its administration; (Gunaratna, 2015).

Moreover, ISIS successfully managed to manipulate the media in transmitting their message of fear and cruelty which was welcomed by some young Muslim recruits scattered in the European community who always felt marginalized and unaccepted by their surroundings. Those marginalized lone wolf Muslims, who were full of hatred, and willing to carry out terrorist activities in the European communities, also welcomed the media message, where they have lived (Ganor, 2015).

ISIS and al-Qaeda are two radical jihadist groups that they focused on ridding the world from the threat, as they perceive it, of Western culture to Islam. These two organizations differ from one another by having different goals, strategies, and ideologies. The goal of Al Qaeda is to overthrow the corrupt "apostate" regimes in the Middle East and replace them with "true" Islamic governments. It considers the U.S. as its primary enemy and the main cause of problems in the Middle East. Al Qaeda believes it will eventually force the United States to stop its support to these Muslim regimes and withdraw from the region altogether, thus leaving the regimes vulnerable to attack from within (Byman, 2015).

On the other hand, ISIS does not follow Al Qaeda's "far enemy" strategy, while Al Qaeda implied their attacks to the western interests at very far outreaches. Instead, they chose a "near enemy" strategy that focused on such "apostate" regimes in the Arab world—namely, the Assad regime in Syria and the Abadi's in Iraq. Like his predecessors, Baghdadi favored purifying the Islamic community first, by attacking Shi'a and other religious minorities as well as rival jihadist groups (Bertrand, 2015).

Moreover, there are significant differences between al Qaeda and ISIS, especially over how to commit murderous acts toward other Muslims. While both are jihadi organizations with deep roots in the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, ISIS proved to be extreme in its interpretation. For ISIS, any Muslim that does not follow the Muslim faith, in the manner dictated by ISIS, is an apostate who deserves to be killed. This includes nearly all Muslims, especially Shia Muslims, whom ISIS considers as pagan apostates who should be annihilated (McCabe, 2017).

These two terrorist organizations competed in their crimes against the civilian populations, and they did not show any respect for human life wherever they governed. The fear tactics were their main weapon of choice against anyone whom they classified as not in line with their interpretation of Islam. For example, in the period of ISIS from 2014 to 2017, the number of civilian casualties was estimated 84, 723. This is articulated in Figure (1) which was referred to by the UNAMI report in 2019 (UNAMI, 2019).




Figure 1: Civilian Casualty Data 2014-2017 (modified from UNAMI, 2019).

3.1 Impact on National Economy

Everybody expected to find everything goes well in the new regime after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, especially in terms of businesses and economic sectors that they hoped to flourish. Unfortunately, what is found on the ground is the opposite. Terrorist groups played a very passive role and affected the economy of Iraq negatively particularly where they had the authority to control the situation and had a grip on their day-to-day administration, for instance, Mosul, Diyala, and Salahaddin were such cities, which found itself under the control of such terrorist groups being isolated from the rest of Iraq. Priority was given to the role and rule of religion by the new regime, which enforced the people to practice a new way of life for all sectors of society and oblige the able-body civilians to be recruited to either defend or face death or persecution. They banned some products and items such as music albums, some types of women clothes from the market as they saw them offensive and removed all forms of liquor and alcoholic beverages from shelves. Hereby, such storeowners were enforced to choose other products to sell. Many of the factories owners found themselves implemented to flee to other parts of Iraq and stay there as internal and external refugees and, hence, shut down their factories and stores besides many other businesses. Productivity became less and social services were at the minimum levels due to such a lack of workforce. Accordingly, the local economy, in particular, and the Iraqi national economy as a whole, suffered a lot. Though productivity and the GNP were very low in the occupied cities, the new terror groups controlled whatever was produced. All of the households and disordered

internal trade between the cities and the external ones with the external countries were affected severely; As a result, the uncertainties and the lack of regulations of such territories made all investors, foreign and domestic, stay away from such locations. For sure, nobody will sacrifice to invest in such a war zone location. The economy and the planned annual growth in such locations were severely affected by this lack of investment (Parker and Moore, 2007).

Notably, Iraq currently makes use of oil as one of the central economic growth factors, and it seems that it will work even in the future. Accounting for nearly 99% of all government revenues and spending, Iraq depends on oil and its sales to afford all the needed foreign purchases. That is, Oil revenues mainly contribute to the budget and local expenditure and functioning of the country every year. It is estimated that Iraq will be the largest unexplored market in the world because the existing reserves of oil are 143 billion barrels and it is expected that there are 50 to 200 billion barrels of oil that are not discovered yet (Jaffe, 2007). According to a report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that issued in 2015 Iraq started to complain of an unprecedented economic situation, due to a major backsliding caused by the events of June 10, 2014, when ISIS occupied the city of Mosul. In addition to a portion anticipated as one-third of Iraqi territories in western parts bordering Syria (International Monetary Fund, 2015). Hereby, ISIS, on the one hand, made use of the oil sector and the wells located in the Ninawa region to support financially their newly established Khalifa and to let their fighters are paid. On the other hand, ISIS worked on spoiling the oil pipelines and the refineries located in the neighbouring governorates, such as the one in Beji in Diyala Governorate. ISIS wanted to carry out two objectives the first of

which was to make the Iraqi Government lose the new revenues from Ninawa oil which was a benefit for ISIS whereas the second objective was to obstruct the oil flow and control the major Iraqi refinery at Beji where oil is refined. For this purpose, ISIS set out attacking the refinery, and there were some major battles in that area. Though this chaos resulted in a very disordered situation for some time, Iraqi forces were successful in preventing the terrorist from achieving their goals, and they cleared the district surrounding the refinery from them. ISIS tried to make another experience in terms of business when it tried to attack Kirkuk governorate and make use of the oil located there as well. Meanwhile, it seemed that the Kurdish forces had an idea about ISIS's intention and plan so that they could dig their heels in Kirkuk governorate and managed to protect the oil wells and most of its territories. As a result, the Kurdish fighters made ISIS suffer a major defeat (Salim and Morris, 2015).

The economic advisor to the Prime Minister at that time, Mr Mazhar Muhammad Salih, revealed the negative impact of ISIS on the economy of Iraq when he confirmed, "the war against ISIS has cost Iraq large sums of money. It was estimated to be around 15% of the Gross National Product (GNP), roughly equivalent to an estimate of 30 billion dollars. In addition to allocating the Iraqi Government an amount of 25 billion dollars, to support the security a force during 2014- 2015 in the financial budget, and it is estimated that the cost of the war amounts to about 10 million dollars a day". He also pointed out "The productive sectors in the governorates that witnessed military operations were paralyzed, as oil productions at the Baiji refinery were stopped" (Zidan, 2015).

As far as the investment sector is concerned, the terrorist group acts and attacks resulted in a deterioration in its level because the

investors do not prefer the State of tension and uncertainty that makes them cancel or postpone their decisions for making investments. Further, declining economic progress rates, lower investment rates, and increased military spending on behalf of other advance sectors resulted from the decline in mergers and acquisitions throughout Iraq, the slowdown of Iraqi economic growth and the decline in stock prices in the markets Global Finance Human Rights Council, 2018) and plans to enlarge present investments (Khalil, 2017).

Notably, another sector of the economy, which was influenced by terrorist actions in Iraq, is tourism. That is, the decline of tourism, which turned into a significant reduction in this industry, was the outcome of these terror brutal acts. In fact, many areas of Iraq where their historical sites attract visitors witness a sort of flourish, and many visitors flocked over such historical sites, but the explosions and Terrorism after 2013 onward led to a significant decline of such tourism. There are also religious sites where tourists always paid them visits during special religious seasons. Knowing precisely how that would affect the tourism at these locals and how it reflects Iraq's tourism sector, these tourists were especially targeted by terror groups (Al-Azzawi, 2015). Albu goes into further details concerning these terror acts and shows that kidnappings and assassinations in addition to bombings were widespread and common at these sites. This was a major influence on tourism and the economy as well, which depended on its revenues. Kidnapping tourists and negotiating the countries of their nationality with a large payment to be given for their release indicates deactivating and numbing the tourism movement in the region and, hence, declining its proceeds of the state treasury. The low economic rise index in most countries of the world is due to

the international political situation and the spread of the threat of Terrorism whereas the developing countries witness the high growth rates in the central developed countries (2016, pp. p-10).

Indeed, according to all the sectors that we discussed above, oil can be considered as one of the necessary sectors of the economy of Iraq. The influences of the terrorist groups can be seen very clearly. The issue of production and exportation will be illustrated in the below figure number (2). There had been a relatively steady decline in Oil productions in southern areas and a steady increase in Oil productions in northern areas of the region (International Monetary Fund, 2015).




Figure number (2) Extract oil (2012-2015) (modified from the International Monetary Fund, 2015).

3.2 Social Consequences

The collapse of the regime in Iraq in 2003 has been distinguished by being a phase, which initiated a major change in the political governance structure in Iraq, and led to the close total collapse of permanent social instability and the unguaranteed situation that many of the major cities in Iraq complained of. The current situation given on the ground makes it difficult to expect how long this phase will continue. Unfortunately, this environment has a bad impact not only on the safe transportation, storage, and supplies of emergency material but also on the quick re-functioning of many of the previous service facilities (UNICEF, 2003).

Displacement is not new in Iraq as it goes back to the period of Saddam Hussein's regime, which was a way adopted to consolidate control over the country. Three major waves of displacement are distinguished by most experts and scholars. That is, the first flow, which began during the U.S., led invasion in March 2003 resulted in the internal displacement of around one million Iraqis and made another 400,000 or so live in refugee-like conditions in other countries. It is this history of displacement, which affected patterns of existing displacement and paved the way for complex regional disputes and property claims (Ferris, 2008).

In fact, bombing al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006 initiated the second wave of extensive sectarian violence, the persecution of minorities, and their displacement. Hereby, fears from sectarian violence or fears of being kidnapped caused many of the Iraqis to abandon their homes. They had no other choices since the sectarian militias targeted them or because their lives were at overt risks (Worth, 2006). That is, according to estimation by the International Organization for Migration in March 2008 nearly 2.4

million Iraqi refugees left the country, mainly towards Jordan and Syria while more than 2.7 million fellows Iraqi could not depart Iraq and stayed displaced in other parts of Iraq (IOM, 2008). Both governments of Jordan and Syria were afraid of their security situation and expected that the operations of al-Qaida associated groups and Islamic militancy will be facilitated and are increased due to the crisis of the Iraqi refugees (Lischer, 2008).

The shocking rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was the third wave of widespread sectarian violence. Though it has been as brutal as it has been quick, it has basically changed the political landscapes of Syria and Iraq where more than a million civilians have been enforced to flee their homes by this group (Lischer, 2008). To be to the point, the U.N. did a survey and estimated that the number of persons who were internally displaced (IDPs) in Iraq reaches 3.2 million while more than 8 million people needed urgent humanitarian aids. However, the compulsory expulsion of many Iraqis is found to be the principal problem that threatened the essential consistency that distinguishes the Iraqi society (World Food Program, 2015).

Having tens of thousands of widows and female-headed households, growing women's weakness is due to the terrorist acts in Iraq, which affected women and children to the degree that an Iraqi woman is found to be in a daily struggle to earn her living. It is estimated that thousands of women and girls have suffered from being kidnapped or trafficked for sexual slavery, prostitution, or held for ransom since 2003. Further, ISIS captured more than 3,000 women and girls in 2014 (Puttick, 2015). Bombings and terrorist acts caused the children to be orphaned and to suffer just like women. That is, they found themselves in a critical situation as they fell into poverty after their main family wage- earner was

kidnapped or killed. The invasion and occupation which was led by US-led western forces in 2003 resulted in the permanent instability, chaos, and unceasing violence that have wracked Iraq where nearly 800,000 Iraqi children are estimated to have lost one or both parents (The New Arab, 2019).

As far as the national education is concerned, it had been affected severely by the terrorist acts in Iraq, particularly in the areas where conflicts were or terrorist groups controlled. For instance, many families were seen refusing to let their children attend schools in areas ISIS-controlled and the justification was the change these terror groups made to the school curriculum to teach and reflect their ideology and instruction. Further, the families were also afraid that ISIS and its fighters would target schools where children could be struck with bombs. In addition to the lack of qualified teachers, the terrorists used many of the facilities such as educational centres as bases, detention centres for military purposes, and they were protected from bombings because they were recognized as education institutions (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2018).

The activities of terrorist groups after 2003 made the Iraqi population suffer from shortages in the health care sector, which is known to be another social consequence. Many health service providers inside the city health centres or outside the city were not only under the threats but got killed or injured as they were unwillingly enforced to stay at the front lines where they joined the terror groups to supply the injured fighters with urgent first aid. Unfortunately, there were many other prevalent types of violence practised against health professionals who verbally or physically abused, threatened, kidnapped, and even were killed. Consequently, much such health staff expressed the wish to leave the country to

stay safe. According to a survey in Baghdad, 70% of health figures have preferred to resettle out of the country. Nevertheless, most of the health care workers were willing to stay if the Government could provide a safe condition and secure working environment to them (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2018).

The Iraqi people suffered from other challenges like drinking water and electricity. The terrorist acts greatly affected two products through which the national security was threatened. Giving control over the cities and the countryside, providing drinking water became one of the strategic aims of terrorist groups (Vidal, 2014). On the one hand, the appearance of these terror groups paved the way for the shortage of water and electric facilities in Iraq. On the other hand, ISIS wanted to target the source of water and electricity supplies such as the Mosul Dam, which is the largest Dam in the country. Geographically, it is known that the Tigris River is known to be impeded by such a dam during the spring season when the snow from the mountains is melted. As a result, this Dam gathers enough water, which in addition to what is provided by the Euphrates River is used as the main supplier of water and electricity as well as the farmlands. Meanwhile, 32 million citizens are making use of the two rivers that are heading towards Baghdad and the southern regions of Iraq (Bender, 2014).

The Figure below (Figure 3) illustrates the general idea of the displaced inhabitant in 2014 according to the different governorates in Iraq. This is showed in the table, in which the highest number of displaced people is hosted in Anbar, which is 35.09%. The lowest number of hosted people can be seen in Baghdad, which is 4% (Relief Web, 2014).




Figure 3: Iraqi Displacement Profile (modified from Relief Web, 2014)

3.3 Cultural Losses

National unity, which was affected by terrorist acts in Iraq, resulting in some serious security repercussions, needs religion and nationalism as two other cornerstones. Though Mosul just like most Iraqi cities was known for its diversity, religious tolerances, and nationalism, it turned into one of the shelters for many terror groups and their activities after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 that knocked down Saddam Hussein's regime. Further, the fall of Mosul in 2014 and the fleeing of the Iraqi Army from the city led the militants to destroy monuments, displace communities that had coexisted for centuries and turned neighbours against each other (Kalin 2017). Moreover, ISIS destroyed and turned into pieces the ancient palace of biblical King Sennacherib, buried for thousands

of years beneath the tomb of the prophet Jonah in the city of Mosul, which the archaeologists discovered (Zaimov, 2017).

Iraq is often distinguished by having different cultures that belong to different ethnic groups coexisting side by side. After 2003, terrorist acts had a great impact on this peaceful coexistence especially cultural heritage which affected the Iraqi national security. The areas occupied by ISIS witnessed the most forthcoming and serious threats to cultural heritage. Hereby, in areas such as the city and region of Mosul in particular, the Sinjar region, and Anbar province in general cultural heritage faced threat more from sustained under-investment and economic hardship rather than through systematic destruction and looting (Nováček et al., 2017). For instance, Iraqi official reports that were cited by Marina Lostal confirmed that the Hatra historical site, a 2,000-year-old fortified city around 100 km south-west of Mosul, was destroyed by ISIS which is believed to demolish the site and loot the cultural artifacts housed inside including gold and silver objects (Lostal, 2015). Furthermore, The Director-General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, in a statement has shown that "the destruction of Hatra marks a turning point in the appalling strategy of cultural cleansing underway in Iraq" (UNESCO, 2015).

ISIS wanted to achieve two purposes via destructing cultural heritage: The first purpose was to prove to its followers that it is dedicated to its own belief system and the second purpose was to draw the attention of the world through making use of this public campaign, which is not more than a destructive act. The attacks on cultural heritage sites, most notably Palmyra in the Mosul region in Iraq, resulted from such publicity, was just like a mystery because to stimulate political reaction the world scandal has been necessary for a long period. Meanwhile, such destructions were acts done by

ISIS in a way, which gave an advantage to others by drawing the attention of probable recruits to its reason and producing additional impetus to wipe out the cultural heritage of others (Nováček et al., 2017).

The terrorist groups got the chance after the attack of ISIS in 2014 to play also a great role in altering the political map of Iraq. The changes began when ISIS set out establishing its own Government under the name of Caliphate over the lands they had recently captured. Though the new Caliphate could not gain the approval of any other country, Iraq lost its national security and sovereignty due to lacking such complete pieces of occupied lands (Arosoaie, 2015).

Exercising control over a broad swath of land in Iraq & Syria showed that the new Caliphate of ISIS was likely growing and getting expanded. However, the only way to put an end to such expansion is to work on shrinking the boundaries of territory under the Caliphate's control. More crucially, it was through using force and violating international law in terms of the State's legitimacy that the Islamic State was able to acquire such territories (Shany and Tal Mimran, 2014).

Figure number 4 indicates the crimes of ISIS against Suni, Shia, and other minorities' heritage. In 2015, ISIS destroyed many different religious heritages in the different districts around Mosul and inside it as well (Nováček et al., 2017).




Figure 4: Mosul heritages of Sunni, Shiite, and other minorities (modified from Nováček et al., 2017)

3.4 The Impact on National Unity

Depending, from its early start, on both foundations of sectarian and religion as its foundation, Iraq is known to be one of the countries distinguished by having various groups within its population and its establishment which were the bases for national unity and security for Iraq all Iraqis. Unfortunately, the terror groups have been recently able to make use of the old colonial tool of "divide and rule" and to penetrate the harmonious diversity through which they worked on the division of the sectarian population and turning one group against the other. They aimed at being able to be given a foothold in the country. The terror groups seemed to have achieved marginal success in breaking out a civil war that they were seeking among the Iraqi sects. They were able

to do so if the Iraqi Government would not supply the supports with both internal and external supports. It is through such support that the Government can regroup and get rid of these terror groups wherever they are found. Unfortunately, it seems that rather than being a strong motivation towards helping the Iraqi community get developed this diversity was turned into an outrageous threat to Iraq and its national unity. The course of the political process in the country had been found under the influence of this population diversity at the early stages of the establishment of the Iraqi Government in 1921. There are many countries such as the United States of America, Switzerland, South Africa, and many others the strength of which is stemmed from the system of pluralistic and diverse nature of the population. Each group or sectarian, whether individually or collectively with the other groups, was proceeding toward a better future due to such a free and liberal atmosphere the Government created. This liberty and coexistence of the group resulted in having a strong foundation for national strength and unity. Conversely, the collaboration between these sectarian groups was becoming less and less when the terror groups got the chance to perforate the social fabric of the society and sustain one sect against the others. What mainly affected the national unity of various groups of the Iraqi population was the fact that the religious unity and the contribution among diverse groups of the population were broken (Abdul Latif and Muhammad, 2018). Therefore, there is an effort to address and focus on the most central impediments national unity in Iraq has encountered.

By early 2006, areas, where Sunni and Shiite Arabs lived together, witnessed the escalation of sectarian violence. Assassinating AL Qaeda's leader al-Zarqawi was a sufficient excuse and a good opportunity for Al Qaeda to increase its attacks

against the Shiite Arabs. Al Qaeda did not differentiate between the ethnic groups of Iraq and went on attacking Shiite Arabs, the Kurds, other minorities, and the Sunni Arabs who reinforced the Iraqi Government and the coalition forces. Al Qaeda described the groups as mentioned earlier as apostates in league with foreign occupiers because they in the viewpoints of al-Qaeda were cooperating with the coalition forces. The way or the intention they had was not the same on a national and personal level. That is, they were pretending to be saviours and protectors of Islam and Muslim countries against foreign occupiers on the national level.

In contrast, on a personal level al-Qaeda fighter was seeking an outlet for animosity, and he did not want to skip a chance to achieve personal ransom. Also, many terrorist leaders who were Salafist (fundamentalist) Sunnis who intentionally provoked sectarian violence against Shiite civilians (Pirnie and O'Connell, 2008) attacked Shiite civilians. The first examples of such hatred appeared when the Al Qaeda group killed guards and ruined the golden dome of the Ali al-Hadi Mosque in Samara, 60 miles north of Baghdad on February 22, 2006. In fact, Shiites considered the demolition of Tombs of Ali al-Hadi and Hassan al-Askari, two of the original 12 imams, which are located inside these two mosques an object of veneration. As a reaction, their destruction prompted Shiite Arab demonstrations and resulted in attacks on Sunni mosques in Baghdad and Basra. "If the government's security forces cannot provide the necessary protection, the believers will do it" is the famous statement that Ayatollah al-Sistani released in this respect (Nordland, 2014).

Iraq's armed forces, the Iraqi Army and the very small Navy and Air Forces besides the internal security forces (the Iraqi Police and elite police, Federal Police, the Counter-Terrorism Force, and

interior security forces) as well as the civilian institutions and ministries that guide and support them generally compose the military scale of Iraqi Security Forces (Khalil, 2006).

Iraqi Security forces aimed at exceeding Iraq's religious and ethnic boundaries and keeping the country unified while struggling against a rebellion. Before 2003, the Iraqi Security forces were enforced to hit civilians whenever they wanted to revolt and this made the people have a bad impression of them. Hereby, it was a good opportunity for the Iraqi Security forces to change the opinions of people about them (Sharp, 2005).

The Iraqi Army and its security forces have needed to be re-built since the collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Hereby, U.S.-led points helped the Iraqi security forces and police financially, trained them, and armed them as well. That is, though since the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 approximately \$19.2 billion has been spent on counterinsurgency training of more than 425,000 Iraqis nearly 200,000 of them were from the Army, air force, naval forces. Besides, to training many police officers, such forces are not found to be so useful from the perspective of the military analysts, and the reasons simply go to the Ethno-sectarian association, corruption as well as lacking robust control and command. To be able to re-establish a strong and powerful security force is to overcome such deficiencies the opposite of which gave a chance to the groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS to act (Bruno, 2008).

It seems that the leadership problems were so severe and complicated to the degree that the Americans could not fully sort out them quickly, they will not be fixed since the selection of senior, and even junior leaders were often based on their ethno-

sectarian affiliation via a system known as quotas (Muhasasa). Likewise, untrained and unqualified officers were employed simply because they were) candidates of political parties and despite there being improper to bear any responsibility, they were often promoted and given higher ranks. Though the situation of Iraqi Security forces was much better in 2009, corruption was prevalent and resulted in purchasing senior and junior ranks so that officers just like Mafia bosses could run their units, rescuing arrested civilians for money and receiving bribes for giving soldiers absent without leave permissions. A knight believes that even 185,000 U.S. troops in Iraq could not find a solution for the weakness of military leadership of the post-2003 Iraqi security system (2016, p. 5). In a word, (Raise Your Voice) did an interview with Yasser Al-Husseini, a legal and academic expert, who found the impact of this corruption quite clear especially when it comes to their political differences on the gains of power. That is, he stated, "As the differences between them intensify, the security situation in the country deteriorates, and incidents of terrorist bombings and assassinations escalate" (RYV, 2016).

Accordingly, such widespread corruption in the security forces kept the Iraqi armed forces ineffective, and it was an outlet for the Shiite militia groups to cover their failures and give justifications to their existence. Meanwhile, it also had a more ominous purpose since it gave way for the officials to create and make use of an informal economy of ill-treatment and exploitation. The situation got worse to the degree that the courts and the rule of law paved the way to a profitable and well-paid market where corrupt officials made families of innocent detainees face extortion. Further, there were employees known as "ghost employees" or "ghost soldiers" who received an essential proportion of the public salary without

being existed on the real ground. It is estimated that corrupt officials received the wages of nearly 30,000 ghost soldiers in Iraq's military. The prevalent problem of corruption in public procurement as well as the corruption that had overwhelmed the Iraqi security forces resulted in the collapse of Mosul in 2014 (Alaaldin, 2017).

After 2003, the USA and Iran were in the race to shape and rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces to use them and obtain their interests. As a result, the U.S. forces won the race at that time and took the lead to develop the Iraqi security forces by getting them trained, armed, and equipped so that they could fight beside them. The U.S. dedicated an amount of money to fund the war in Iraq throughout 2011, and a large portion of the money went to the security forces during Iraq's civil war between 2005 and 2011. Making use of the role it has in creating post-invasion Iraqi security forces from 2004-2011, the USA was able to affect the way the Iraqi security forces were shaped and to have an outstanding relationship between the U.S. and the leaders of Iraqi forces at the time (Cordesman et al., 2006). Iran from its side, was able to establish an influential relationship with Iraqi forces, specifically Shiite militia groups via the leader of Quds Army; Qasim Sulaimanye.⁹ Iran found the new Iraqi situation after the downfall of the Baath regime a real threat to Iran's national security due to the presence of the U.S. and its allies near the borders of Iran. Hereby, to supply its political allies with the means to impair or eradicate political rivals, and to cause an embarrassing and shaming defeat for the United States that would dissuade the future U.S, Iran also armed, trained, and funded Shiite militias and Shiite (and, on occasion, Sunni) rebels. In fact, U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey accused Iranian-supported Shiite militias and rebellion groups of killing up to one-quarter of all U.S.

combat casualties in Iraq (Eisenstadt et al., 2006). Ultimately, Al-Qaeda and ISIS was the beneficiary from the contest between Iran and the U.S. at that time. ISIS and Al-Qaeda attacked both foreign and Iraqi forces because they believed that those who help the foreign forces would be in the same boat as the foreigners (Laub, 2016).

Figure number 5 indicates the number of Iraqi Security Forces casualties, in the period of Al Qaeda in 2006 until 2013. The total number in this period reached 9,708 (Kaválek, 2015).




Figure 5: Iraqi Security Forces Casualties (modified from Kaválek, 2015)

Conclusion

In summary, Terrorism harmed the national economy in Iraq. The first component of the industry impacted was the reduction of the labour force, which in turn, affected the productivity, and the Gross National Product (GNP) of the country. This was followed by the rise in the levels of unemployment, a rise in the levels of inflation due to the scarcity of goods and services that led to inflated prices. These major pillars of the economy were severely damaged because of Terrorism. However, since ISIS is no longer active in Iraq and the swaths of land they occupied are now liberated, all sectors of the economy have shown signs of slow but steady recovery.

Also, we can describe the conditions in Iraq during the presence of terror groups, as it was a war on civilians; it mainly affected the livelihood and the well-being of the civilian population due to the lack of security that prevented the Iraqi people from leading a normal life. These insecure situations affected many aspects of Iraq's social structure in terms of affordable housing, proper education, and the provision of healthcare services. The most vulnerable sector of the society, which was affected by these shortages, was the women, the children, and the elderly. Going beyond the direct victims of the conflict, the Iraqi society faced many problems, namely the lack of security in terms of housing, education, and health care, as well as protection for the more vulnerable such as women and children.

Moreover, the terrorists wanted to destroy the national unity of Iraq by preventing interaction, despoiling social cohesion, and mutual support among all people, regardless of their affiliation. Iraq had, to some degree a national cohesion despite ideological

beliefs, diversity of cultural background, religious beliefs, and their ethnicity. It is worth mentioning that the issue of national unity of the Iraqi populous has had complications since the start of its establishment in the early 20s. This unity complication was further exasperated after the collapse of the previous regime on September 4, 2003, and its accompanying collapse of state institutions and agencies, which provided an opportunity for terrorist groups to achieve their goals. The collective impact of the terrorist group's acts since 2003 had been a great decline in the national economic growth, severe disruptions in the social fabric of the society, and tremendous harms to Iraq's cultural heritage.

Furthermore, we can state that even though the Iraqi security forces were being well trained and equipped with the necessary weapons to bring back their past luster and glory, the issue of sectarianism and affiliations based on religious principles has always worked against unified armed forces. Added to that, the lacking of strong leadership and corruption among the ranks has worked against unified Iraqi security forces.

Note

1 Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, was born in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, in 1957. Bin Laden joined the Afghan revolution to stand against the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1979. Bin Laden worked on creating the al-Qaeda network after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, and he tried to expand the attacking power of his organization to achieve global strikes against Western interests. As a result, September 11, 2001, witnessed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The end of bin Laden's life story was on May 2, 2011, when President Barack Obama declared that bin Laden had been assassinated in a terrorist compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Robinson,

2001. BIN LADEN BEHIND THE MASK OF THE TERRORIST. Arcade, USA, New York, pp. 4-9.

2 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, another influential terror figure, was born in Zarqa, Jordan in October 1966. His large family belonged to the trans-Jordanian Bani Hassan tribe, which is famous for its loyalty to the royal Hashemite family. He was one of the most vital terrorists in Iraq and head of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda branch, he depended on his terrorist Strategy to grow a wave of bloody terrorist attacks such as suicide bombing attacks and car bombs in 2004 primarily against the American and coalition forces in Iraq and at Iraqis cooperating with the Americans (especially Shi'ite Muslims). For further readings, refer to Michael, G 2007. The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Defence Studies, 7(3), p. 339.

3 Driving the threat of Sunni Islamic terrorism worldwide, Salafi-jihadism exists as a strategic issue. AS a kind of political and social reaction to appearances of this threat, whether in the Middle East or the West, a constant theme is the rejection of Salafi-jihadists' claims to legitimacy as members of the Islamic faith. In detail, see Wimbhurst A. (2016). Nothing to do with Islam: The historical origins, ideology, and strategic threat of global Salafi-jihadism. Australian Defence College, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS), p. 1.

4 The word "takfeer" as an Islaamic term, is defined to be the process of declaring someone an apostate from the religion. Details about the word Takfeer and its various derivatives were unknown to the early scholars. However, early scholars drive its concept from Quraan and the Sunna sect of Islam and a few statements. The principle of "Takfeer" falls into two categories: one is " Takfeer Al Mutlaq (absolute)", and the other is "Takfeer al- Muayyan (specific)". There are also those scholars who add a third category to the principle of Takfeer; they call it " Takfeer al-Kullee (the total takfeer)", meaning the total Takfeer. To furthermore see GREEN, C, 2009. THE KHAWAARIJ AND THE CREED OF TAKFEER: DECLARING A MUSLIM TO BE AN APOSTATE AND ITS EFFECTS UPON MODERN DAY ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS. MASTER THESES. The UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA, p. 63. Moreover, see Zalmi, M, I 2014. Quranic Research Group. Ihsan Publishing and Distribution. First Edition, p. 167.

5 Ayman Muhammad Rabie al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda leader, was born on June 19, 1951, in Maadi- Egypt. He stood out as one industrious boy that excelled in school. He joined his first Islamic group when he was just 14 years old. He graduated from Cairo University Medical School in 1974 and got his masters in surgical procedures in 1978. Even though he attained such a high degree of speciality in medicine, he did not pursue his medical profession. Instead, he joined the radical Islamic Jihad to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1979. With a joint publication with Al Qaida Leader Osama Bin Laden, he officially integrated the Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Al Qaida. Al Zawahiri became one of the most wanted by the FBI after the events of September 11, 2001. Up to now, his whereabouts have remained a mystery but, according to the videos and statements that he releases, it is suspected that he lives among some tribes in Pakistan. To outline al Qaeda ideology, al Zawahiri published a book entitled Knights under the Prophet's Banner in 2001.

6 Abu Ayyub al-Masri was one of Al-Qaeda's leaders; he was born in Egypt. In 1982, he was one of al-Zawahiri's disciples. After that, he moved to Pakistan until 1995. Then he came to Afghanistan to join Al-Qaeda. He became an expert in making roadside bombs and explosives. In 2001, al-Masri travelled to Iraq and worked with Ansar al-Islam in the north. Later, he joined al-Qaeda and became very close to al-Zarqawi, director. For further reading, see Baker, 2006. A Profile of al-Qaeda is New Leader in Iraq: Abu Ayyub al-Masri. Terrorism Focus 3(24), p.

7 Baghdadi - real name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri - was born in 1971 in the central Iraqi city of Samarra. Pre-modern Sunni scholars believe that his claim that his religious Sunni Arab family was descended from the prophet Muhammad's Quraysh tribe was a key qualification for becoming a caliph. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced to be ISIS's Caliph, Arabic for "successor," in the mid-2014 and continued till he got killed in an airstrike in 2019. Baghdadi assumed to be the religious, political, and military leader of all Muslims. Nobody knew where Baghdadi was hiding after the fall of ISIS's Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Though he had been declared dead or seriously wounded more than once, he reappeared in ISIS propaganda recordings, most recently in August 2018. Finally, the U.S. government announced on October 27, 2019, that he had been killed in a raid by U.S. forces in Syria by U.S. forces. ISIS as Baghdadi's successor appointed Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi. For further readings, refer to BBC NEWS 2019. Who was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? [Online] Available

at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50200392> (Accessed December 17 2018). Moreover, see Counter Extremism Project n.d. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [Online] Available at:

<https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi>(Accessed December 17 2018).

8 Caliph in the Islamic religion is considered a political and religious leader to the entire Muslim world, and he is the successor to the prophet Mohammed. Historically, Shura that represents a community consultation, and one of the earliest forms of democracy in Islam, played an influential role in choosing Caliph, just as the days were the four Caliphs ruled the Islamic world after Mohammed. Furthermore, see Alshdaifat, 2016. The Re-Birth of Islamic Caliphate against Jordan: Present and Putative Policy. DAR Publishers/ The University of Jordan. Dirasat, Shari'a and Law Sciences, 43(1) p. 593.

9 Soleimani was born in Qanat-e Malek, Kerman, Iran in 1957, and spent his entire adulthood in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, which he joined after the 1979 revolution in Iran. In the late 1990s became commander of the Quds Force. Between 1997 and 1998, it is one of five IRGC arms, the strongest security force in Iran, and the regime's main prop. In 1998, he was a major general of the Quds Force until he died in 2020. To further detail see, Zimmt, R., 2015. Portrait of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' Qods Force, Instigator of Iranian Subversion, and Terrorism in the Middle East and around the Globe. The Meir Amit Center for Intelligence.

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پوخته:

ئەم لىكۆلنەوھىيە بە ناونىشانى (تيرۆر و ئاسايشى نەتەوھىيى عىراق ۲۰۰۳-۲۰۱۷: لىكەوتە كۆمەلایەتى و ئابوورى و كەلتورىيەكان). ئەم توئىژىنەوھىيە شىكردنەوھىيەك بۆ كارىگەرىيى كىردەوھى گىرووپە تيرۆرىستىيەكان، بەتايبەتى ھەردوو گرووپى تيرۆرىستىيى قاعىدە و داعش دەكات، ھەروھە كارىگەرىيى كىردەوھ تيرۆرىستىيەكان لەسەر يەكگرتووى خاكى عىراق و لایەنى كۆمەلایەتى و كەلتوورى كۆمەلگای عىراقى. ئەنجامەكانى ئەم توئىژىنەوھىيە ئاماژە دەدەن كە تا چەند كىردەوھ تيرۆرىستىيەكان كارىگەرىيان لە سەر ئاسايشى نەتەوھىيى عىراقى بە جى ھىشتەو. كىردەوھ تيرۆرىستىيەكان، بەتايبەت داعش، كارىگەرىيەكى قولى لەسەر ئاسايش و سەقامگىرى كۆمەلگای عىراقى ھەبوو .

ملخص:

هذا البحث بعنوان "الإرهاب والأمن القومي العراقي ٢٠٠٣-٢٠١٧: الخسائر الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والثقافية". يناقش تأثير أعمال الجماعات الإرهابية ، خاصة تنظيم القاعدة وتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية علي الأمن القومي العراقي. بالإضافة إلي ذلك ، يسلط الضوء علي تأثير الجماعات الإرهابية علي الوحدة الوطنية العراقية ، والقطاعات الاجتماعية والثقافية للمجتمع العراقي. تشير النتائج إلي مدى تأثير الأعمال الإرهابية علي الأمن القومي العراقي من حيث التكلفة والوقت والجودة. إن الأعمال الإرهابية ، وخاصة أعمال داعش ، كان لها أثر عميق علي أمن وسلامة العراق واستقراره ، وأخلت بالتماسك الاجتماعي للمجتمع العراقي